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BOOK REVIEW
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. By James Q. Wilson.
Basic Books, Inc ., 1973) . Pp. 359.

(New York:

What ever happened to interest groups? They have disappeared from
professional journals , replaced by paradigms, mathematical models and
sophistica ted voting studies. The mysterious disappearance was undoubtedly prompted by the indignities imposed upon the poor pressure
group during the past decade: declared immoral by David G. Smith,
reduced to communications agent by Milbrath and Co.. and finally
accused of utter ineffectuality by Lewis Dexter-the
interest group
simply crawled off center stage, abandoned to he less prestigious roles
still open in the daily paper, popular journals, and the doctoral dissertations of young scholars who didn't know better. Indeed. recent research
debunking traditional group theory has been accepted by most orthodox
political scientists. Those few scholars awaiting the Second Coming of
those omnipresent, muscular pressure groups described by Earl Latham
and David Truman may be watching in vain.
Those whose expectations are somewhat more modest may be satisfied with Political Organizations by James Q. Wilson. Although Wilson
clearly questions the recent denigration of group influence and laments
the declining professional concern with organizations in politcs, he does
not so much refute the emerging conventional wisdom as sidestep it. Do
organizations determin e public policy? "Some do, some do not." Instead
of developing another interest group theory of politics, which he candidly admits would be a step in the wrong direction , Wilson sets for
himself a more modest goal. Since organizations seem to be a permanent
feature of the political landscape, one must at least develop an explanation for their political activities. Thus , Wilson takes the organization
itself as his central problem.
Wilson is above all preoccupied with the problem of organizational
maintenance; survival is obviously a prerequisite for influence. The way
group leaders solve this perpetual problem will have important implications for other aspects of organization life. The question of how organizations recruit members and keep them involved has vital ramifications
for others: How are officials selected and what constraints do they face?
How do organizations cope with the external environment composed of
other private groups and public agencies? To these questions Wilson
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brings a decade of analysis and insight into the functioning o.f public
and private organizations.
In Part I the author addresses the maintenance problem, focusing
on individual incentives. Accepting in part Mancur Olson's argument
in The Logic of Collective Action that most members of politically active
groups join for nonpolitical reasons, Wilson rejects Olson's emphasis on
economic incentives as the major source of organizational attraction.
Renning the now classic Wilson-Clarke taxonomy of material, purposive,
and solidary incentives, he insists that the motivations for joining organizations are as varied as individuals themselves. Nevertheless, the pre dominant incentive structure will usually condition organizational size,
leadership discretion, and the political strategies open to the group.
In one of the most provocative sections of the book Wilson outlines
the conditions affecting the appearance of organizations. The "market"
for the benefits "offered" by groups is determined primarily by the social
structure. Middle and upper-class citizens possess the financial resources,
organizational skills and psychological attributes needed to maintain a
rich organizational life. A predominantly lower-class society will be
characteristically devoid of much organizational life. Although the social
structure may determine the general market for organizational memberships, the political structure will also affect the general availability of
incentives. This structure may provide either rewards or discouragement
to collective political action . The political system offers material or other
benefits to organizations which can be used to attract members. The
combination of social and political structure set limits on the successful
creation and maintenance of various types of organizations. Wilson uses
his scheme, for example, to explain the problems in creating organizations of the poor: the poor can be permanently organized only when
material incentives are present, brokered by middle-class entrepreneurs .
Although some organizers o.f the poor will dispute Wilson's contentions,
the experience of recent decades tends to bear out his interpretation.
In Part II, Wilson goes on to apply his overall perspective to labor
unions, business associations, civil rights organizations, and political
parties. In a masterful synthesis of case study literature, he demonstrates
the variety of strategies used by successful organizations. Thus, the
NAACP has combined general purposive incentives with relatively strong
local solidary incentives to sustain a fairly large dues-paying base. Business groups like the National Association of Manufacturers may rely
on a shifting membership of business firms ideologically committed to
the "militant defense of the free competitive enterprise system." Labor
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unions rely primarily on semi-coercive material incentives, although purposive incentives may be more important in their early years. Wilson's
incisive analysis includes a discussion of the explanatory value of this
theory in understanding the political behavior of group leadership.
Part III examines the problems of organizational creation and
change, of authority relations within groups, and the ever-present problem of internal democracy. The discussion of internal power distribution
throws new light on an old question. Wilson argues that the less members value their membership in an association, the less likely they will
be to participate, and hence, the more oligarchical the organization. In
contravention to some conventional wisdom, Wilson argues that organizaions based on material incentives will also offer the leadership wide
powers-as long as the How of benefits to members is unimpeded. Only
in organizations emphasizing purposive or idealogical incentives do
leaders face the necessity of remaining "democratic." This may explain,
for example, why the leadership of the AFL-CIO maintains a much more
liberal political stance than its rank-and-file.
In Part IV Wilson turns to interaction between organizations. He
dismisses game theory as largely irrelevant to real world coalition building, stressing that coalitions are more often influenced by maintenance
imperatives. Drawing on the developing disciplne of interorganizational
analysis, he suggests that organizations seek "autonomy," i.e. a recognized claim to certain resources, a demarcated field of operation, and
an access to a membership base. Organizations approach coalitions with
less optimism about the advantages of a united front than wariness about
incursion on their autonomy. Thus, many "natural coalitions" seem to
have an unnaturally difficult time appearing.
Ultimately, of course, the question of power is the rai,sond'etre for
organizational studies. Although Wilson initially declines to become
involved in the group power dispute, he is eventually forced to confront
it. First, Wilson considers the possibility that interest group power may
be conditioned by the nature of the interest groups themselves, an approach taken by traditional group theorists. Wilson feels that this approach, though necessary and helpful, is not enough. As a supplement,
he suggests that group involvement and power may be determined by
the nature of the issue. After rewarding Theodore Lowi with a pat on
the head for his classification of regulative, distributive, and redistributive policy arenas, Wilson dismisses the scheme as rather muddled,
offering his own fourfold classification based on the distribution of costs
and benefits involved, one becoming familiar to public policy analysts.
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Although an improvement on Lowi's scheme, this division seems just
as indistinct on many concrete policy questions, especially when political
as well as economic costs and benefits are considered.
A perusal of this brief outline of Political Organizations almost
demands the cliche: it is impossible to do justice to this major work in
a review. Each page suggests hypotheses. Do indeed new organizations
rely on purposive incentives to recruit members, shifting later to material
or solidary incentives-material for a dozen dissertations there. A more
traditionally-oriented group theorist could use Wilson's suggestive remarks on incentive systems to provide explanations for shifting organizational goals, changing leadership behavior, or altered coalition building. A political scientist combining behavioral and traditional skills might
test Wilson's assertations about the importance of social and political
structure in the development of large political organizations. For example, did powerful organizations in the South appear first in those
states with relatively prosperous populations and the friendliest state
political structure?
Whatever the revelations in these or other efforts to test Wilson's
approach, the profession has reasons for gratitude that he has seen fit
to retrieve the political organization from the newspapers and leftist
journals. In addition, political organizers and activists may find a reading
of Wilson not only sobering but helpful.
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